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The new Federal Rules of Evidence were approved by the Supreme
Court of the United States on November 20, 1972, for filing with
Congress in the session commencing in January 1973. If they are
approved by Congress the Rules become final in their application to
federal courts.' In the long process of their drafting, the proposed
drafts were made available to Congress and many helpful suggestions
came from lawyer members; some suggestions were adopted and
others ironed out.
The first draft was printed in the Federal Reports in March
1967, and suggestions and criticism from members of the bench and
bar were requested. The response was voluminous, running into
thousands of pages, and very valuable. It came from individual law-
yers, judges and committees of bar organizations. Every criticism
and suggestion was considered and many changes were made in a
revised draft, which was also submitted for consideration by the legal
profession through publication in the Federal Reports in March
1971. With the additional response, the Advisory Committee on
Rules of Evidence and the Standing Committee on the Rules of
Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States had the benefit of exhaustive observations upon almost every
aspect of the proposed rules. Some further changes were made and
a final draft was approved by the Judicial Conference of the United
States for processing through the Supreme Court and the Congress
under the rulemaking authority.
Many other sources of research were used in the drafting of the
Rules including writings in legal periodicals and text authorities, the
Model Code of Evidence of the American Law Institute, the Uniform
Rules of Evidence of the National Conference of Commissioners on
* Dean Emeritus, Colleges of Law, Florida State University and University of Iowa.
A.B., Grinnell College, 1920; J.D., University of Iowa, 1923; S.J.D., Harvard University,
1935; LL.D., Grinnell College, 1954.
1. Act of March 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9, requires congressional approval
of the Rules, changing the procedure of 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1970) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072,
2075 (1970). See 41 U.S.L.W. 2542 (April 17, 1973).
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Uniform State Laws and the new codes of evidence of California,
New Jersey, Kansas and the Virgin Islands. Full consideration was
given to the case law of state and federal courts in the search for the
most desirable rules. The extensive notes to the Rules explain the
reasons for adoption, refer to the source materials for the Rules and
give an indication of the wide scope of research and thoroughness
of their preparation. The Advisory Committee, composed of out-
standing trial lawyers, district judges of federal courts and evidence
teachers, was concerned with both the principle and the practicality
of the Rules in controlling admissibility and exclusion of evidence.
The Rules are believed to represent the best of present-day thinking
upon the subject of evidence and are destined to have a great influence
upon the laws of states in the adoption of new evidence codes, similar
to the influence of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on state civil
procedure codes. They should lead the way to improving the law of
evidence and to obtaining a uniformity of rules for the benefit of
lawyers and judges. Each of the Rules could be called a highlight
when applied to the litigated issues of fact in a trial. The highlights
selected for discussion in this article are matters of interest to all
members of the bar. Some are highlights because they cover significant
changes the Rules make in the law of at least some jurisdictions,
others because they involve issues over which there is great contro-
versy, which the Rules resolve for federal courts.
I. THE MEANING OF HEARSAY
Sections (a), (b) and (c) of rule 801 define what is hearsay, and
section (d) designates statements that are not hearsay. Much in these
sections resolves hard-fought controversies and covers matters fre-
quently arising in trials.
The definition of hearsay is tersely and simply stated:
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or
(2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an
assertion.
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by
the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
Out-of-court statements of a person and conduct intended to be
an assertion offered in court as evidence to prove the truth of the
matter stated are regarded by all courts as being hearsay. This fits
into the conception of the function of a witness upon the witness
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stand, which is to testify about what he personally knows upon a
matter perceived by him and not what others have said about the
facts in issue or what he thinks about the facts perceived by him.
Testimony as to what others have said is objectionable as hearsay,
and testimony as to what one thinks about the facts is excludable as
opinion.2 Both exclusions are, of course, subject to exceptions.
A. Nonverbal Conduct
All of rule 801(a), (b) and (c) represents the law as it now exists
in the Anglo-American scheme. The conflict comes with nonverbal
conduct, a term not included in the Rules' definition of hearsay.
Under rule 801(a)(2) nonverbal conduct constitutes a "statement"
only if the conduct was intended by the actor to be an assertion by
him. If a person had no intent that his conduct be the assertion of
a fact, the conduct, when offered as proof of the inference of fact
deduced from it, is not hearsay under the rule. Thus conduct
from which a relevant fact may be reasonably inferred is admissible
as evidence of the inferred fact and the hearsay rule of exclusion
has no application. Like much circumstantial evidence, the inferred
fact is free from the motive to falsify and represents the true belief
of what the facts are by the person whose conduct has been proved.
As the person did not intend his conduct to be a communication,
there is no danger that the inference of fact from it is an intentional
falsification. The exceptions give insight into what is hearsay. It
must involve a situation in which the mind of the declarant is
directed to the statement and in which there is a danger that he will
represent the facts falsely.3 Statements admitted under the exceptions
are still hearsay, but the fear of fabrication is minimized because of
the circumstances required for the exception. Inferences implied
from conduct do not reflect the intention of the actor to state the
inferred fact, and the possibility of an intentional untruth is rarely,
if ever, present.
If a person's action is intended by him as an assertion, it is a
hearsay statement, and if testimony of the conduct is offered in a
trial, it is excluded under rule 802, unless it can be fitted into one of
the enumerated exceptions. To illustrate, a nod of the head is equiva-
lent to the assertion "yes" to a question calling for a "yes" or "no"
answer. The raising of a hand by a member of a group when asked
2. J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 501, 524
(1898).
3. See generally Ladd, The Relationship of the Principles of Exclusionary Rules
of Evidence to the Problem of Proof, 18 MINN. L. REV. 506, 509-16 (1934); Maguire, The
Hearsay System: Around and Through the Thicket, 14 VAND. L. REv. 741, 749-60 (1961).
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who did a certain thing amounts to an answer "I did."4 The assertive
aspect of hearsay conduct is quite different from the testimony,
offered as evidence that it was a cold day, of one who had looked
out the window in the winter and had seen that people on the streets
had their overcoats on with their collars pulled up.
Other illustrations may be helpful in understanding the problem.
If A writes a letter to B, with whom he is well acquainted, and asks
him to become an active partner in A's business, there is an inference
that A regarded B to be a person of sound mind, capable of engaging
in the business. If B dies and an action is brought to set aside his
will on the ground of mental incapacity, the letter to B making the
above proposal, when offered in evidence to prove the soundness of
B's mind, creates an inference of A's opinion that B had mental
capacity sufficient to make a will. Was the letter hearsay? The famous
English case of Wright v. Doe Dem. Sandford Tatham5 rejected, under
somewhat similar circumstances, the admission of a letter as hearsay
evidence of opinion. It was treated as an assertion by the actor of the
fact inferred from the conduct. In an Iowa case, State v. Minella,6
in which A was indicted for the murder of X, A and B were standing
together when one of them fired a shot killing X. When the investiga-
tion of the crime commenced, B fled from the community and at
the trial was not available as a witness. The court held that the
flight by B could not be considered to show that B, not A, committed
the murder. The court regarded the flight of B to be the same as his
confession and inadmissible as a hearsay confession of a third party.
Could the flight of B be said to be a statement by him that he was
guilty of the crime? It is conduct from which an inference of guilt
could be drawn, but B by fleeing surely had no intention of stating
that he was guilty. The inference is the same whether the flight is
by a third person or by a party in the trial. In a late Florida case,
Busbee v. Quarrier,7 a father brought an action for the wrongful
death of a minor son against the operator of an automobile that
struck the son from behind while he was operating a bicycle. Judge
Sturgis commented on the flight of the defendant as an admission by
conduct stating, "[a] person driving an automobile does not ordinarily
4. On assertive and nonassertive conduct, see Falknor, The "Hear-Say" Rule as a
"See-Do" Rule: Evidence of Conduct, 33 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 133 (1961); McCormick,
The Borderland of Hearsay, 39 YALE L.J. 489 (1930); Rucker, The Twilight Zone of
Hearsay, 9 VAND. L. REv. 453 (1956); Wheaton, What is Hearsay?, 46 IOWA L. REv.
210 (1961).
5. 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (1837).
6. 158 N.W. 645, 655 (Iowa 1916).
7. 172 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
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run down bicyclists or pedestrians on the highway, and if he does,
he takes some notice of it, even if he ultimately decides on flight or
falsehood to protect himself. If he decides on flight, it calls into
operation the presumption of conscious guilt, commonly inferred
therefrom in criminal cases and properly to be considered in civil
cases."" Flight by a party to litigation from events causing a tort or
crime creates an inference that he is responsible for what occurred
and the fact is admissible to prove the party's liability or guilt. It
is not necessary for admissibility that an inference drawn from con-
duct be the only inference that could be made so long as it is the
strongest inference in logic and reason. One who flees from the scene
of a crime may have fled because of fear that he would be wrongly
charged with it or because he may not want to be involved, but the
most logical evaluation judged from human behavior generally is
that he fled because of guilt. It is sometimes looked upon as a state-
ment admitting what had occurred, and its acceptability as proof is
based upon the admissions exception to the hearsay rule. The justifi-
cation for the admissibility is a logical inference from conduct that
he is at fault although he did not intend to say so and would probably
deny it. This is the reason the federal rule does not include non-
assertive conduct in its definition of hearsay and permits the inference
from conduct to be direct evidence of the inferred fact.
Because some courts confused the meanings of hearsay and in-
ference from conduct, the Model Code of Evidence identified inference
from conduct as hearsay and provided exceptions that admit most
of the testimony. Model Code rule 501(1) defines a statement re-
garded as hearsay in these terms: "A statement includes both conduct
found by the judge to have been intended by the person making the
statement to operate as an assertion by him and conduct of which
evidence is offered for a purpose requiring an assumption that it
was so intended." The Uniform Rules of Evidence did not follow
the Model Code but took the position subsequently adopted in the
new Federal Rules. Uniform rule 62 (1), in defining a "statement,"
included "nonverbal conduct of a person intended by him as a sub-
stitute for words and in expressing the matter stated." It did not in-
clude conduct that was not so intended. The Uniform rule has been
criticized because of the chance that the actor engaged in the non-
verbal conduct could have been mistaken in the facts that gave rise
to the conduct. While the conduct may dispel the danger of intentional
falsification, cross-examination of the actor in court is needed to ex-
8. Id. at 22.
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pose mistake of facts causing his conduct.9 The notes to the Federal
Rules admit this possibility but state that "the Advisory Committee
is of the view that these dangers are minimal in the absence of an
intent to assert and do not justify the loss of the evidence on hearsay
grounds." A further answer to the criticism is that the same reasoning,
if applied to the hearsay exceptions when the declarant is not present
as a witness in the trial, would eliminate the exceptions. The cir-
cumstantial probability of reliability required to establish an excep-
tion gives strength to the declaration as being free from the motive
to falsify but does not preclude mistake in the facts declared. The
circumstantial element of proof, found in facts implied from conduct
not intended as an assertion, is strong enough to let the conduct be
what it is, rather than to create a fiction that it constitutes a state-
ment. Relevant inferences should not be excluded as hearsay when
based upon logical deductions from conduct. Nonassertive conduct
is usually of a kind that the actor would not be moved to act if the
inferred fact were not true. The circumstances must be strong enough
for the inference to gain a sufficient standing to meet the test of
relevancy.10 The danger of mistake of fact is no greater here than for
a spontaneous utterance admitted as an exception to the hearsay
9. For an ably written article developing this view, see Finman, Implied Assertions
as Hearsay: Some Criticisms of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 14 STAN. L. REV.
682 (1962). Also discussing the problem is Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application
of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARv. L. REV. 177, 214-18 (1948).
10. The process of weighing the circumstances was discussed in State v. Sorensen,
455 P.2d 981, 987 (Ariz. 1969), in determining whether absence of flight was relevant
to show innocence. Chief Judge Hathaway stated:
The defendant requested that an instruction on absence of flight should have
been given, arguing that "where flight is shown in the evidence, an instruction
thereon is proper and not an undue comment on the evidence." State v. McLain,
74 Ariz. 132, 245 P.2d 278 (1952). Instructions on flight seem to be premised on
"* * * the supposition that with a consciousness of guilt, 'the wicked flee when
no man pursueth' to avoid punishment," as observed by this Court though [sic]
Justice Lora E. Lockwood in State v. Owen, 94 Ariz. 404, 411, 385 P.2d 700
(1963), vacated, 378 U.S. 574, 84 S.Ct. 1932, 12 L.Ed.2d 1041. Considering the
rest of the proverb, '" * but the righteous are bold as a lion," it would
seem to follow that boldness infers innocence. Contemplated, however, is the
state of mind of the guilty and the innocent. Verily, flight to escape detection
or capture is circumstantial evidence of guilt. Absence of flight under other
circumstances may seem far better calculated to avoid detection. Absence of flight
does not necessarily reflect the state of mind. Would that detection of criminals
were so simple.
We see no prejudice to the defendant, in the trial court's refusal to give the
instruction, since the jury is free to draw all reasonable inferences from the
absence of flight, without specific instructions from the court. The matter is
more properly one of argument.
See also note 11 infra.
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rule.11 Therefore the possible danger of error of fact should not be
used to require conduct to be defined as a statement when it is not so
intended. The position of the new Federal Rules is to leave the
determination of the admissibility of nonassertive conduct to the
strength of the circumstances giving rise to the inference of fact . 2
B. Statements Specified as Not Hearsay
Surely one of the highest highlights of the new evidence Rules
is rule 801 (d), entitled "statements which are not hearsay." This
section deals with realistic and needed improvements in the law. Sub-
section (1) deals with prior statements by a witness, and subsection (2)
covers the subject of admissions by a party-opponent. Each will be
considered separately.
1. Prior Statements by a Witness.-Rule 801 (d) (1) says:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay
if-
(1) Prior Statement by Witness. The declarant testifies at the
trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the
statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testimony,
or (B) consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an ex-
press or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or im-
proper influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person
made after perceiving him ....
Parts (A) and (B) of the rule are concerned with the use of prior
out-of-court statements of a witness admitted for impeachment be-
cause of their inconsistency with the testimony given in court, and
with the use of those statements admitted to rebut a claim by the wit-
11. For a discussion of spontaneous utterances, see Ladd, supra note 3, at 513-14.
12. In determining whether conduct creates an inference of a fact, care must be
used in evaluating the strength of the inference. This is closely associated with a con-
sideration of relevancy of the circumstances from which the inference is drawn to the
facts to be inferred. The Federal Rules (in Article IV, "Relevancy and Its Limits") ex-
clude conduct with certain possible but insufficient inferences in the following matters:
(1) subsequent remedial measures taken which, if taken previously, would have made
an event less likely to have occurred (rule 407); (2) compromise and offers to compro-
mise to show an acknowledgment of liability (rule 408); (3) payment of medical and
similar expenses as an inference that the party was responsible for them (rule 409); (4)
offer to plead guilty, nolo contendere, and a withdrawn plea of guilty as evidence of
guilt (rule 410); and (5) evidence that a person had or did not have liability insurance
as an inference upon the issue of negligence (rule 411). One reason for the exclusion
is that other factors are more likely to have caused the conduct than belief by a party
that he motivated the conduct. This involves an evaluation judgment upon what may
reasonably be inferred from the conduct in order to make the conduct relevant. The
strongest reason to exclude the above evidence is the public policy aspect that people
should be encouraged to do the things specified without fear that their action will be
used against them.
1973]
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ness that his testimony was a recent fabrication resulting from an
improper influence or motive to falsify. How may the triers of fact
consider these statements? Are they admissible only to neutralize the
effect of the testimony given in the trial or to dispel any belief that
the testimony was the product of ulterior motives or influence? Can
the impeaching statements do more than impeach? Can prior con-
sistent statements made before the motive to falsify arose or the
alleged influence occurred be used by the triers of fact for a purpose
other than to show that the testimony given in the trial was free
from such influence? Are impeaching and corroborating statements
that have met the procedural requirements for admissibility limited
to testing credibility? Can they also be considered as substantive
evidence of the truth of the facts asserted in the out-of-court state-
ments?
Most courts have rigidly restricted out-of-court statements of a
witness, whether consistent or inconsistent, to use in determining the
credit to be given to the testimony.13 These statements are among
the most common methods of testing credibility, and the usual prac-
tice is that the court instructs the jurors that the prior statements
shall not be used by them as proof of the facts stated.14 The reason
usually given is that the statements of a witness made by him out of
court are hearsay.15 Although various reasons for the hearsay rule
have been stated by the courts, the universally accepted reason, stated
by Dean John Henry Wigmore, is the lack of opportunity to cross-
examine as a testing process in the attempt to discover the truth.' 6
Professor Edmund M. Morgan added a reason that was implied by
Dean Wigmore: absence of an oath to tell the truth. Professor Morgan's
statement of the reason for the hearsay rule is that "[h]earsay is ex-
cluded because of potential infirmities with respect to the observation,
memory, narration and veracity of him who utters the offered words
when not under oath and subject to cross-examination. ""7 It is with
these concepts as the reasons for the hearsay rule that the change in
the law was made in rule 801 (d) (1), providing that prior statements
of a witness, testifying under oath in a trial, are not hearsay when
offered as inconsistent statements to impeach or as consistent state-
13. See, e.g., Comer v. State, 257 S.W.2d 564 (Ark. 1953); People v. Tate, 197
N.E.2d 26 (Ill. 1964); Wininger v. Day, 376 P.2d 206 (Okla. 1962). But see note 26 and
accompanying text infra.
14. See Bartley v. United States, 319 F.2d 717, 719-20 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
15. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 251 (2d ed. 1972); 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 1018 (b) (rev. ed. 1970); Ladd, Some Observations on Credibility: Impeachment of
Witnesses, 52 CoRNII. L.Q. 239, 249-51 (1967).
16. 5 J. WICMoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 1361-62 (3d ed. 1940).
17. Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 HARv. L. REV. 481, 541 (1946).
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ments to rebut recent fabrication. Thus, when impeaching and con-
sistent statements become admissible under the provisions of rules
607 and 613, they may be considered both as they affect the credibility
of the witness and as substantive proof of the facts asserted in them.
The position taken in the Federal Rules has substantial judicial
authority supporting it.i" The Model Code of Evidence of the Ameri-
can Law Institute9 and the Uniform Rules of Evidence of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws20 reached the
same result as the Federal Rules, but did so by regarding the out-of-
court statement as hearsay and creating an exception for its admission
and use as substantive evidence. The reason for creating the exception
was that the safeguards for truth testing were present if the declarant
testified in court and was available for cross-examination. This is
the same reason the federal rule states that the out-of-court statement
is not hearsay if it is made by one testifying in the trial.
The most striking decision on the subject is the United States
Supreme Court case of California v. Green.2 1 Section 1235 of the new
California Code of Evidence,2 2 which became effective January 1,
1967, and which is similar to the new Federal Rules, was challenged
as an unconstitutional limitation on the defendant's right of con-
frontation guaranteed by the sixth amendment. The Court rejected
the holding of the California Supreme Court in People v. Johnson23
where, on the same issue, the amendment was held to have been vio-
lated. Justice White, for the Green majority, had the following ob-
servations: 24
Viewed historically, then, there is good reason to conclude that the
Confrontation Clause is not violated by admitting a declarant's out-
of-court statements, as long as the declarant is testifying as a witness
and subject to full and effective cross-examination.
It is, of course, true that the out-of-court statement may have
been made under circumstances subject to none of these protections.
18. See the opinions of Judge Friendly in United States v. De Sisto, 329 F.2d 929 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979 (1964); Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Allied
Stevedoring Corp., 241 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 984 (1957) and Di Carlo
v. United States, 6 F.2d 364 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 268 U.S. 706 (1925); Judge Phillips in
Curtis v. United States, 67 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1933); Judge Doerner in Turner v. Cald-
well, 349 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961) and Blanks v. St. Louis Public Serv. Co., 342
S.W.2d 272 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961).
19. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 503 (b) (1942).
20. UNIFORM RuLE OF EVIDENCE 63 (1).
21. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
22. CAL. Evm. CODE § 1235 (West 1968).
23. 441 P.2d 111, 68 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1051 (1969).
24. 399 U.S. at 158-59.
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But if the declarant is present and testifying at trial, the out-of-
court statement for all practical purposes regains most of the lost
protections. If the witness admits the prior statement is his, or if
there is other evidence to show the statement is his, the danger of
faulty reproduction is negligible and the jury can be confident that
it has before it two conflicting statements by the same witness.
Thus, as far as the oath is concerned, the witness must now affirm,
deny, or qualify the truth of the prior statement under the penalty
of perjury; indeed, the very fact that the prior statement was not
given under a similar circumstance may become the witness' ex-
planation for its inaccuracy-an explanation a jury may be expected
to understand and take into account in deciding which, if either,
of the statements represents the truth.
The new federal rule is sound in reason and is practical and
realistic. The witness who perceived the events in issue is present in
court and has given testimony of those events under oath. If he ad-
mits making the inconsistent statement, he has the opportunity to
explain it. If his explanation is not acceptable to the triers of fact,
they may use what he admitted to be a prior inconsistent statement
to discredit his testimony. If the triers of fact believed the witness
spoke the truth in the prior statement that he admitted making, it is
not reasonable to expect the triers to limit its use to credibility in their
decision-making process regardless of a court's instruction that it may
be used to discredit but not to prove. The mental gymnastics required
to articulate and segregate the use of prior statements for impeach-
ment purposes only makes the limitation rule a formalistic fiction in
disregard of realism.
Another aspect of the problem arises when the witness denies he
made the inconsistent statement and the person to whom he is alleged
to have made the statement testifies that he did make the statement.
It may be argued that a statement the witness had not made could
thus be used as substantive evidence against the party adversely affected,
but this argument is fallacious. This assertion would apply to preclude
all use of prior statements for impeachment as well as for substantive
purposes. Before a prior statement can be used by the triers of fact
to impeach, the triers of fact must first determine that the statement
was in fact made, and the same is true if the statement would be used
as proof on the substantive issue. If the triers concluded the statement
had not been made they could not use it for any purpose.
The basic matter settled by the new federal rule is that prior
statements of a nonparty-witness, when admissible for impeachment
purposes or to rebut a claim of recent fabrication, are not hearsay
and cannot be limited in their use on that ground. The declarant of
[Vol. 1: 191
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the prior statement is testifying in court under oath about events
perceived by him, and the opportunity to cross-examine him in respect
to what he knows about the events eliminates the dangers that the
hearsay rule was designed to avoid. The same problem does not exist
with a party-witness because his admissions constitute substantive
evidence and their admissibility is not dependent upon inconsistent
testimony given at the trial.2 5
An interesting and very recent decision by the Florida Third
District Court of Appeal, Wallace v. Rashkow, 2s gives some new light
upon the problem in Florida and may pave the way to place the law
of this state in accord with rule 801(d)(1)(A) and (B) discussed
above. The plaintiff driver brought an action for damages sustained
in a four-automobile rear-end collision case. He claimed the car ahead
stopped on the highway and that he brought his car to a stop some
distance back, but that the two vehicles to the rear ran into his car
causing it to strike the car ahead. The defendants were the drivers
of the other three cars. The evidence was in conflict on whether the
plaintiff's car was struck and pushed into the car ahead or whether he
struck the car first and was thereafter hit by the cars from the rear. A
witness called by the plaintiff testified that he saw the accident from
his backyard which was adjacent to the highway and that the plaintiff's
vehicle was stopped, or almost stopped, twenty or thirty feet behind
the first car at the time it was struck by the other two cars. On cross-
examination the witness was impeached by a prior inconsistent written
statement stating that the plaintiff's car struck the car ahead first.
Over the plaintiff's objection this statement was admitted and the
trial court refused to instruct the jury that the extrajudicial incon-
sistent statement could be used only to discredit the testimony that
the witness gave in court, but that it could not be used as substantive
proof. The jury returned a verdict against any recovery by the plaintiff.
The principal error assigned on appeal by the plaintiff was the failure
of the trial court to give the limited instruction.
Associate Judge Ward, in his opinion affirming the lower court,
recognized the rule almost universally followed in the past that im-
peaching statements of a nonparty-witness could be used only to dis-
credit the testimony given by the witness in the trial and to neutralize
its effect, rather than constitute substantive evidence of the fact stated
in the impeachment. He pointed out that the rule had not been con-
sidered by appellate courts in Florida since 1911 when the supreme
court stated in Tomlinson v. Peninsular Naval Stores Co. 2 7 that "[p]rior
25. The subject of admissions is separately considered. See p. 207 infra.
26. 270 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
27. 55 So. 548 (Fla. 1911).
1973)
Florida State University Law Review
inconsistent statements may affect credibility, but they are not evidence
to prove a fact not otherwise shown." He regarded the words "not
otherwise shown" to mean that, if there were other evidence intro-
duced upon the matter contained in the inconsistent statement, the
impeaching evidence could be used as substantive proof. Apparently
his view was that, if the impeaching statement were the only evidence
upon an essential fact to sustain a party's claim, it would not be sub-
stantively sufficient to uphold a verdict. Here there was other evidence
,that the plaintiff struck the car ahead before he was hit by the vehicles
from the rear. Therefore, the impeaching statement to the same effect
could be used as proof of that fact. The appellate court regarded a
limitation instruction to be mere verbal ritual that jurors would
neither understand nor attempt to follow. The court cited the opposi-
tion of Professors Wigmore 28 and McCormick 29 to the prevailing rule
that impeaching statements cannot be used as substantive evidence,
but did not go into their reasoning, which would reject the limitation
on the ground that the impeaching statement is not objectionable as
hearsay because the witness who perceived is present in court and
can be cross-examined under oath.
Judge Ward's refusal to instruct that the impeaching statement
could be used only on the credibility issue left the statement with
the jury both as impeachment of what was said by the witness in
court and as proof of the truth of what was said to the contrary out
of court. When he says that its use as substantive evidence may be
made because of other evidence offered in the trial upon the same
matter, would it not be difficult to conclude that it would not be
substantive if other evidence were not introduced? The extrajudicial
statement is the same whether other evidence is introduced or not.
The Federal Rules, the Model Code and the Uniform Rules do not
make this distinction. The inconsistent statements are admissible for
what they are worth. They also require no instruction as they con-
stitute evidence to be considered the same as any other relevant
evidence. Attorneys will surely argue to the triers of fact their strength
and weakness in the light of the circumstances surrounding them. The
question of sufficiency of evidence could always be argued to the
court or jury if there were no other evidence than the inconsistent
statement to maintain an issue. Inasmuch as there are perhaps only
rare cases in which other evidence that is consistent with the inconsis-
tent statement is not in the trial record, the Wallace case is an im-
portant decision in accord with modern thinking that impeaching
28. 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1018(b) (3d ed. 1940).
29. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 39 (2d ed. 1972).
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statements of the testimony of a witness testifying in court can be
used as substantive evidence. They are not hearsay by the federal
rule, but if classified as hearsay they constitute a reasonable exception
to the rule of exclusion and are admissible as proof of the facts stated.
Out-of-Court Statement of Identification of a Person.
Is it Hearsay?
Rule 801 (d) (1) (C) provides that the statement of identification
soon after perception of a person is not hearsay. The testimony of what
was said in the identification of a person as the one who committed
a crime could come from three sources: third persons who were present
at the identification and observed what took place, persons who had
seen the crime committed and were themselves identifying witnesses,
and the victim of the crime who identified the accused. Is the testi-
mony of what occurred and what was said in an extrajudicial identifi-
cation excludable as hearsay when offered in the trial of the accused
as evidence of his identity? Is testimony of prior identification of the
accused through photographs hearsay when offered to identify him?
There is a conflict in the cases upon the issue, some authorities re-
garding prior identification as hearsay and excludable, others consider-
ing it as direct substantive evidence of identity admissible in the
trial as proof of the fact. 30 The federal rule takes the latter position
and wisely so. The admission of prior statements of identification is
not dependent upon contradictory testimonial evidence, which evi-
dence would be necessary if it were offered for impeachment. The
subject in inquiry in the trial is the identity of the accused, and the
prior statements of identification are a part of the process of determin-
ing it. Any person who was present and participated in the prior
identification or who heard the identification made by others is a
competent witness if the identification witness is present in the trial
and testifies upon the subject. For example, when the victim of a
robbery testifies in the trial identifying the accused, he may also
testify as to his former identification of the accused in a line-up or
elsewhere. The prior identifications have more probative value, are
usually much closer to the time when the events occurred giving
rise to the issue and can be more meaningful than the testimony in
court pointing out the accused. The circumstances surrounding the
prior identification also assist the triers of fact in more accurate evalua-
tion in testing the accused's identity. The statements of persons who
observed the commission of a crime, whether the victim or passers-by,
made when they saw the accused on the street or in a line-up or in
30. For cases indicating an equal division, see Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 460-62 (1960).
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the examination of photographs, are a source of proof related directly
to the issue.
Courts have struggled with this question of admissibility, trying to
find some way to make the prior identification escape the hearsay rule.
In an Iowa decision, 31 the trial court attempted to avoid the hearsay
rule by labeling as res gestae testimony concerning statements of
identification made by the victim of a robbery. The declaration that
the accused was positively the man was made as the accused walked
onto the platform as the last man in a line-up. The appellate court
disagreed with the trial court, stating that mere spontaneity of ex-
pression would not per se determine res gestae. The court disapproved
the reasoning of the trial judge, but held the prior identification not
to be prejudicial since the victim had identified the accused in the
trial. The vital question of whether the prior statement of identifica-
tion was hearsay, and thus excludable, was not discussed. The Florida
First District Court of Appeal took a forward-looking position in
Willis v. State, decided in 1968. 3 2 The victim of a store robbery and
his employee testified from photographs and a police line-up con-
cerning the accused's identification. Following them as a witness, a
police officer testified that he was present and observed the victim
select the accused from seventy-five photographs exhibited for ex-
amination, and was present when the victim and the employee identi-
fied the accused in the line-up. Thirty-eight years before, the Florida
Supreme Court held in Martin v. State33 that the testimony of the
victim about his extrajudicial identification of the accused from photo-
graphs was admissible but, on a point not involved in the appeal,
observed in dictum that testimony by officers or third persons that
the victim identified the accused or his photograph was not admissible
because it was hearsay.
In the Willis case the appeal was on this issue. The accused, whose
defense was alibi, claimed that, on the testimony of the identifying
witness alone, his chance of raising a reasonable doubt in the minds
of the jury would have been much greater. Chief Judge Wigginton,
after examining the divided authorities, concluded that the better
rule is that the testimony of third persons who observed an identifica-
tion is admissible as direct evidence of identity and is not objection-
able as hearsay. In the trial the identifying witnesses had testified about
their prior identification and the court stressed the corroborative effect
of the third party's testimony, but admission was justified because
31. State v. Ayles, 219 N.W. 41 (Iowa 1928).
32. 208 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
33. 129 So. 112 (Fla. 1930).
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the identifying witnesses were present, testified in court and were
subject to cross-examination by the accused.
The court adopted the same theory embraced in new rule 801
that when "the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject
to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is
.. (C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving him," it
is not hearsay. When these conditions are met the hearsay aspect ceases
and proof of the identifying statement may be given by the testimony
of third persons who heard the statement made. What Chief Judge
Wigginton said about corroboration was applicable to the facts of
the Willis case in which the extrajudicial statements were corrobora-
tive. As long as the person who made the prior identification state-
ment testifies in the trial with respect to identification and is available
for cross-examination, the prior statement is admissible as relevant
evidence on the issue.
On facts different from the Willis case the distinction becomes ma-
terial. What rule applies if the victim of the crime or person who saw
its commission testifies in the trial but does not identify the accused
because of lack of memory or from fear? Is proof of the prior identifica-
tion admissible through those present at the identification? The
California court in People v. Gould4 faced the problem in which
the conviction depended on regarding the prior statements as direct
substantive evidence of identity. The identification of Gould in the
trial by the victim of the burglary was uncertain. She testified that it was
hard for her to point out someone after all the time that had elapsed
before the trial. On appeal, affirming the conviction, Justice Traynor
said that her testimony did not amount to an identification but that
the evidence of her extrajudicial identification was admissible as in-
dependent proof of identity. In the opinion the justice stated, "[t]he
failure of the witness to repeat the extra-judicial identification in
court does not destroy its probative value, for such failure may be
explained by loss of memory or other circumstances. The extra-
judicial identification tends to connect the defendant with the crime,
and the principal danger of admitting hearsay evidence is not present
since the witness is available at the trial for cross-examination. '3 5 In
Judy v. State,36 the Maryland court departed from its earlier, stricter
holdings and approved the admission of prior identification as sub-
stantive evidence. The same position was taken by the Washington
court in State v. Simmons,37 in which many cases were reviewed and
34. 354 P.2d 865, 7 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1960).
35. Id. at 867, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 275.
36. 146 A.2d 29 (Md. 1958).
37. 385 P.2d 389 (Wash. 1963).
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emphasis was placed upon the fact that the identifying witness and the
witnesses to the identification testified in the trial and were available
for cross-examination.
The question arises what the result would be if the alleged identify-
ing witness called by the prosecution were to testify that the accused
was not the person who robbed him and to deny that he had made
the prior identification. Under rule 607 a party may impeach his
own witness, and under rule 613 he may do so by proof of prior in-
consistent statements. If the triers of fact believe that the prior state-
ments had in fact been made, under rule 801 (d) (1) (A) they may
be used as proof of the facts asserted.
Other problems may arise in the admissibility of prior identifica-
tions. In the case of Gilbert v. California,8 the exclusion of a line-up
identification was required because the accused was not represented
by counsel, but the Court noted without criticism the current trend
of admitting proper prior identifications as substantive evidence when
the identifying witness testifies and is available at the trial for cross-
examination. It appears that the Court had no objection to this ad-
mission if the requirement of the sixth amendment had been followed.
The new federal rule simply eliminates the hearsay obstruction
in proof of prior identification. United States v. Wade39 and the
Gilbert case were directed to the constitutional problem of whether
testimony of a prior identification or identification in court could
be given by a witness who had observed the commission of the crime,
when the identification was made after the filing of criminal charges
and before the accused was represented by counsel. Both the in-court
identification and testimony of the prior identification were excluded
as violations of the sixth amendment. In the recent case of Kirby v.
Illinois,4 0 in which an identification at the police station of those
accused occurred shortly after the commission of the crime and be-
fore any charges had been filed, the sixth amendment was said not
to have been violated. The victim of the robbery was permitted to
testify as to his prior identification and again identified the robbers
in court. The key point of the majority opinion was that the out-of-
court identification occurred before any formal charges against the
defendants had been made. The majority opinion by Justice Stewart
restricted the application of Gilbert and Wade to the facts of those
cases in which the prior identifications came after the accused had
been charged with the crime. The dissenting opinion by Justice
38. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
39. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
40. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
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Brennan, in which Justices Douglas and Marshall joined, stressed
the loss of the sanction of evidence exclusion as a method of assuring
that law enforcement officers will respect the constitutional right of
the accused to have the assistance of counsel at the critical time of
the out-of-court identification. The majority opinion does not re-
gard that right to exist unless there has been a formal charge filed
against the person who is identified.
This represents a material change in what was generally thought
to be the effect of Wade and Gilbert. It reflects a changing attitude
of the Court in which the rights of the public to protection from
criminal acts are being given greater consideration and constitutional
provisions are given a stricter construction. The wording of the sixth
amendment providing for the accused "to have the Assistance of Coun-
sel for his defence" leaves open for interpretation the meaning of "for
his defence." The Kirby case interpreted "for his defence" to mean
that the right under the sixth amendment does not arise until a
person is charged with a crime. Though application of the fifth
amendment in confession cases presents a different question, there is
nothing in any of the sixth amendment cases that casts any doubt
on the new federal rule's removal of the hearsay reason that prevented
the introduction of evidence of a prior identification.
2. Admissions by a Party-Opponent.-Admissions by a party have
usually been considered as an exception to the hearsay rule.41 Ordi-
narily they have been statements against the interest of the party
at the time they were made. In the decisions in which the statement
was disserving when made, it was easy for the court to justify the
exception for the reason that the party would not have made a
statement against himself unless he believed it to be true. The dis-
serving element created a circumstantial probability of reliability,
which is the basic reason for exceptions to the hearsay rule. Ad-
missions, while they may impeach the party-witness who has given
contradictory testimony, are uniformly regarded as substantive evi-
41. The Model Code classified admissions as hearsay by designating them in rule
506 an exception to the exclusion of hearsay under rule 502. The Uniform Rules ex-
clude hearsay in rule 63, which also provides for exceptions including admissions found
in subdivisions (7) (admissions by parties), (8) (authorized and adoptive admissions)
and (9) (vicarious admissions). Wigmore, however, places the subject of admissions
under relevancy and states that they need not pass the gauntlet of the hearsay rule
when offered against a party because the admitting party is the only one who could
invoke the hearsay rule when the admission is offered by his opponent, and he need
not examine himself. 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1048 (3d ed. 1940). See also C. Mc-
CORMICK, EVIDENCE § 262 (2d ed. 1972) (considering admissions separately from the
hearsay rule and expressing the view that even if admissions are regarded as hearsay,
the requirements for admission of the testimony have been satisfied).
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dence of the admitted fact.42 Furthermore the preliminary require-
ment of asking the witness whether he made the statement before
permitting other witnesses to testify that he did so, as in the im-
peachment of a nonparty-witness, has never been required for the
admissibility of admissions. An admission of a party-opponent may
be introduced into evidence by the other party to support his cause
as direct proof of the admitted fact.
Admissions must be distinguished from declarations against inter-
est by a nonparty-witness, which are hearsay and are admitted under
a separate exception. In early common law and in many modem
courts the declaration against interest is a very narrow exception and
is restricted to declarations against pecuniary and proprietary inter-
ests. 43 Admissions of a party have never had such limitations. The
new federal rule 804 (b) (4) has greatly broadened the declaration
against interest exception and includes almost any statement of a
kind that the declarant would not normally make unless he regarded
it to be true. Unlike admissions, declarations against interest in most
states and under the new rule are not admissible unless the declarant
is unavailable as defined by federal rule 804(a).4 4 The disserving
element of a declaration against interest at the time the statement is
made goes to the very heart of this exception.
Is the disserving aspect of an admission at the time when the
statement was made a requirement for its admissibility? If an ad-
mission is regarded as hearsay and if an exception to the hearsay
rule is dependent upon a circumstantial probability of reliability,
the answer is yes. The reliability factor is that the statement was
against interest at the time it was spoken. Thus, if an admission is
hearsay, a statement by the party-opponent that was self-serving when
made, but against his interest in the trial in which it is offered,
would be inadmissible because of the absence of circumstances indi-
cating reliability. The problem was presented in a Michigan case45
in which a wife, as beneficiary of a life insurance policy, brought an
action against the insurance company after her husband's death. The
defendant company claimed fraud perpetrated by a false representa-
tion in the insured's application for the policy, in which he stated
that he never used stimulants to excess. As evidence in the trial that
42. See 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1048 (4) (3d ed. 1940).
43. See Ward v. H.S. Pitt & Co., [1913] 2 K.B. 130; Jefferson, Declarations Against
Interest: An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 58 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1944); Morgan,
Declarations Against Interest, 5 VAND. L. REV. 451 (1952).
44. UNIFORM RULE OF EVDENCE 63(10) does not require unavailability. Otherwise,
the federal rule is the same as the Uniform rule.
45. Krajewski v. Western & So. Life Ins. Co., 217 N.W. 62 (Mich. 1928).
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the insured had used stimulants to excess, the defendant company
offered the sworn pleading by the wife in a suit for divorce against
the insured shortly after the insurance policy had been issued. In
the pleading she stated that at that time and for five years in the
past her husband became grossly drunk weekly, that each payday he
returned home at midnight in a drunken condition and with his
funds almost exhausted. Other detailed facts of his drunken condition
were set out. These declarations were self-serving when made but
were disserving to the plaintiff when offered by the defendant in-
surance company as proof of no liability on the policy. The state-
ments in the pleadings of the divorce case were held admissible as
admissions, the court not theorizing upon whether it was admitted
as an exception to the hearsay rule. Courts generally test the admis-
sibility of admissions by weighing their disserving effect in the case
on trial, and of course that would be the only time when a party
would offer them against his party-opponent. This calls into question
whether an admission is hearsay and whether its admissibility de-
pends upon an exception to the hearsay rule.
Federal rule 801 (d) states that admissions by a party-opponent
are not hearsay, and then in subsection (2) specifies in detail the
situations in which they are admissible. Why are admissions of a
party-opponent not hearsay? The answer comes back to the reasons
for the hearsay exclusion, that the party adversely affected does not
have the opportunity to test the declarant by cross-examination under
oath. Does the party-declarant need to test himself? Can he claim
that his own statements when not made under oath are not reliable?
The answer is in the negative to both questions, and thus he does
not need the protection afforded by hearsay exclusion. Therefore,
the new federal rule, well supported by reason, makes the firm
statement that admissions by a party-opponent are not hearsay.
The question arises: what admissions by a party-opponent are ad-
missible? Rule 801 (d) (2) says that a statement is not hearsay if:
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered
against a party and is (A) his own statement, in either his individual
or a representative capacity, or (B) a statement of which he has
manifested his adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by
a person authorized by him to make a statement concerning the
subject, or (D) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a
matter within the scope of his agency or employment, made during
the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a co-con-
spirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy.
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Divisions (A) and (B) represent the law as it now is commonly
applied. A person's statement against himself is admissible or, if he
has representative capacity, it is admissible against the person repre-
sented. Division (B) is a statement of adoptive admissions in which
one agrees or acquiesces to the statements of another. Silence when a
person makes a discrediting statement about another in his presence,
which under the circumstances would call for a protest, manifests
belief in the truth of the statement constituting an admission by
conduct."6 Its weight is evaluated by what would be normal human
behavior under the circumstances. In criminal cases, when the accus-
ing statement is made by a law enforcement officer, the privilege
against self-incrimination precludes the classification of silence as an
admission because by silence the accused may be asserting the privilege
rather than acknowledging or denying the truth of the statement.4 1
The fifth amendment cases on custodial interrogation requiring the
accused to be informed of his privilege to remain silent resolve this
problem.4"
Division (C) resolves a conflict in the common law by drawing no
distinction between statements on subject matter that a principal
has authorized the declarant to make to third persons and statements
made by an agent to his principal." As pointed out in the reporter's
notes, Uniform rule 63 (8) (a) and the new California Code5° make
admissible as an admission a statement by a person authorized to
make a statement "for him," that is, for the principal, whereas the
federal rule uses the words "by him." New Jersey evidence rule 63 (8)-
(a) ,51 patterned after the Uniform Rules, changed this provision to one
similar to that adopted in the Federal Rules. Although there is a
conflict in the authorities, the better position is believed to be that
taken in the federal rule. It admits as an admission statements con-
cerning subject matter about which the declarant has been authorized
to speak when the statements are made to his employer or another
employee as well as when the statements are made to a third person.
46. See Sullivan v. McMillan, 8 So. 450 (Fla. 1890). A distinction is to be made
when a person fails to reply to a letter in which a demand has been made, such as
for the payment of money claimed to be due, or in which an accusation is made. The
failure to reply is not an absence of conduct from which an admission may be inferred.
See also Nicolaysen v. Flato, 204 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1967), cert. denied,
212 So. 2d 867 (1968); Falknor, Silence As Hearsay, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 192 (1940).
47. Cf., e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
48. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
49. See the concurring opinion of Justice Gordon in Rudzinski v. Warner Theatres,
Inc., 114 N.W.2d 466, 470 (Wis. 1962). See also Falknor, Vicarious Admissions and the
Uniform Rules, 14 VAND. L. Rav. 855 (1961).
50. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1222 (West 1966).
51. N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 2A, ch. 84A (Supp. 1972).
210 [Vol. 1: 191
NEW FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
Records made by an employee as requested by his employer are ad-
missible against the employer although the record is an intra-company
report not made for outside use. The high degree of trustworthiness
of intra-company reports is equal to that of business records, which
are admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule although they may
be self-serving. Furthermore, there is no privilege that would pre-
clude their use.52
Division (D) of rule 801 (d) (2) deals with a difficult problem in
evidence; and as the position taken is the exact opposite to the rule
commonly applied, it is surely one of the highlights of the new
Federal Rules. The rule provides that when an admission by an
agent or servant is made during the existence of the special relation-
ship concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employ-
ment it is admissible against the principal or employer. The majority
of courts have viewed the matter through the concepts of the sub-
stantive law of agency and have excluded admissions about things
the agents or servants were employed to do but about which they
had been given no authority to speak. 3
The trend is away from this position and in favor of the federal
rule. Florida has taken a position in accord with the federal rule in
the frequently cited case of Myrick v. Lloyd.54 There the Florida
Supreme Court held that an agent's admission that he was at fault
in an automobile accident, which occurred while he was acting in
the scope of the service he was asked by the principal to perform,
was admissible against the principal. Justice Adams recognized the
conflict of authority, but cited Wigmore55 and said "we have chosen
the above as the more practical and liberal rule."561 In a later case
in which an employee of a hotel stated facts showing liability, there
was a similar holding in which Chief Judge Carroll of the Florida
Third District Court of Appeal cited the Myrick case and stated that
"[a]n admission against interest made by an employee in the course
of and within the scope of his employment and relating to a matter
which is not beyond the penumbra of his duties or employment, is
52. See 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1557 (3d ed. 1940).
53. Branch v. Dempsey, 145 S.E.2d 395 (N.C. 1965), held inadmissible an admission
by a truck driver when offered against his employer, but the separate opinion by
Judge Sharp, id. at 411, gives an excellent and extensive discussion favoring the position
taken in the Federal Rules. Accord, Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Glickman, 450 F.2d
416 (9th Cir. 1971); Northern Oil Co. v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 347 F.2d 81 (2d Cir.
1965); Pedersen v. Kuhr, 201 N.W.2d 711 (Iowa 1972); Wieneke v. Steinke, 233 N.W.
535 (Iowa 1930).
54. 27 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1946).
55. 4 J. WIGMosE, EVIDENCE § 1078 (3d ed. 1940).
56. 27 So. 2d at 616.
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a recognized exception to the hearsay rule, and such a statement by
the employee will be admissible against the employer as an admission
against interest. '' 5
7
In a leading case, Martin v. Savage Truck Line, Inc.,58 the court,
after considering an 1886 case of the United States Supreme Court to
the contrary,59 held that an agent's admission consisting of facts about
an accident that occurred in the performance of his duties was ad-
missible against his employer. District Judge Morris stated:60
The primary objection urged to a statement such as is here involved
is that, while it was a statement against the interest of the person
making it, subjecting him, as it did, not only to civil liability, but
possibly to criminal sanctions, it cannot be considered a statement
against the interest of his principal, because he was the agent of
the principal only for the purpose of operating the vehicle, and
not for the purpose of making statements concerning its operation.
Undoubtedly the decision of the United States Supreme Court
would be binding upon this Court and compel a decision that the
proffered statement was not admissible, unless very real and drastic
changes have occurred since that decision which compel a different
holding now. It is noteworthy that in more recent times decisions
and text writers have held the results of the decision mentioned to
be totally at variance with present-day reality.
A Wisconsin case, Rudzinski v. Warner Theatres, Inc.,61 has special
reference value in presenting both sides of the problem. In the
majority opinion it was held that the trial court was not in error in
excluding the employee's admission, which was made to another
employee and offered against their employer. The court discussed
the authorities sustaining this view and then reversed on other
grounds. An opinion by Justice Gordon, who concurred in the re-
versal but disagreed with the majority holding on the agency question,
presents one of the most able and extensive presentations favoring
the admissibility of the admissions by an employee against his em-
ployer when made concerning services he was employed to perform.
He stated:6 2
57. Gordon v. Hotel Seville, Inc., 105 So. 2d 175, 177 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1958),
cert. denied, 109 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1959).
58. 121 F. Supp. 417 (D.D.C. 1954).
59. Vicksburg & Meridian R.R. v. O'Brien, 119 U.S. 99 (1886).
60. 121 F. Supp. at 418-19. See generally 4 J. WGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1078 (3d ed.
1940).
61. 114 N.W.2d 466 (Wis. 1962).
62. id. at 471.
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The test of admissibility should not rest on whether the princi-
pal gave the agent authority to make declarations. No sensible
employer would authorize his employee to make damaging state-
ments. The right to speak on a given topic must arise out of the
nature of the employee's duties. The errand boy should not be able
to bind the corporation with a statement about the issuance of
treasury stock, but a truck driver should be able to bind his em-
ployer with an admission regarding his careless driving. Similarly,
an usher should be able to commit his employer with an observation
about a slippery spot on the lobby floor.
It is enough to show the existence of the employment and the
general nature of the employee's work. There may be cases where
a further foundation will be needed to develop that the utterances
are fairly within the employee's scope of authority. Surely there
can be little doubt that a theater usher's range of discussion
properly includes the clean-up of a wet lobby floor.
An odd situation occurs under the majority rule when the court
holds a declaration to be an admission and not a spontaneous utter-
ance and instructs the jurors that they may consider the admission
by the truck driver against himself as a defendant but that they
shall not consider it against the employer-defendant in determining
the employer's liability.63 When there is enough evidence apart from
the admission to take the case to the jury against both defendants,
is it conceivable that jurors will find the driver liable for negligence
but hold the defendant employer not liable because they did not re-
gard the evidence sufficient without the admission? When the em-
ployee and employer are joined as defendants, the only time the
limited use of the employee's admission has a practical effect in the
outcome of the trial is when the evidence, apart from the admission,
is insufficient to take the case to the jury and the defendant employer
makes a motion for a directed verdict, a situation that seldom occurs.
The new federal rule will resolve the conflict found in federal
cases. It is believed to present the more enlightened and practical
point of view. It has the support of Model Code rule 508 (a), Uniform
rule 63 (9) (a) and Kansas and New Jersey, which have adopted this
provision of the Uniform Rules. Judged on the basis of evidential
values, it is sound. An agent or employee would not, while employed,
want to make statements about what he had done in performing his
services that admitted acts for which both he and his employer would
be liable unless the statements were true.
Rule 801 (d) (2) (E) makes statements of one conspirator admissible
63. Wieneke v. Steinke, 233 N.W. 535 (Iowa 1930).
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against others in the conspiracy if made in the course and in the
furtherance of the conspiracy. It is not necessary that the admission
be in the presence of the co-conspirator if it is made in the further-
ance of the conspiracy and if the existence of the conspiracy is in-
dependently proven. The principles are well presented in the recent
case of United States v. Schroeder, 4 in which statements by one con-
spirator in the planning of a robbery were admitted against another
without regard for the presence or authorization of his associates in
the crime. Other statements of one of the conspirators made after the
robbery were held not admissible because not independently proven,
but were admissible because made in the presence of the defendant
conspirator and acquiesced in by him. The federal rule states the
law as uniformly accepted and could be assumed as being within
provision (D) of rule 801(d) (2) dealing with agency. As pointed
out in the notes to the rule, the theory of agency of a conspirator's
statement is at best a fiction, and provision (E) as stated in the
federal rule makes it unnecessary to comment on it.
II. THE ADMISSION OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE
Character testimony is used primarily in two ways: to show the
probability or nonprobability that a person did what he is claimed
to have done and to test the credibility of a witness who testifies at a
hearing. Different rules apply to each purpose for which evidence of
character is offered. Federal rule 404 deals with the issue of proba-
bility and rule 608 relates to the credibility of witnesses. The method
of proving character is set out in rule 405 and in rule 608 (a). The
federal rules relating to the admissibility of character evidence clarify
by stating in a simple form the law as it is commonly accepted, with
one exception provided in rule 607, which permits a party to im-
peach his own witness without the limitation that the party calling him
is surprised by his testimony. The use of prior convictions of a crime
as a test of credibility is stated in rule 609, and the use of a judgment
of conviction as proof of the facts that were required to sustain the
conviction is provided for in rule 803(22) as an exception to the
hearsay rule. Both of these rules resolve a material conflict in the
law and will be considered in Part III of this article, which deals
with admissibility of convictions for both purposes-to impeach and
to prove.
64. 433 F.2d 846 (8th Cir. 1970). cert. denied, 401 US. 943 (1971).
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A. Limitations on the Admissibility of Character Evidence
Federal rule 404, entitled "character evidence not admissible to
prove conduct; exceptions; other crimes," provides:
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's char-
acter or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose
of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his
character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut
the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of char-
acter of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the
prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of
peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide
case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness
as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person
in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. This sub-
division does not exclude the evidence when offered for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
Although habit of a person or the routine practice of an organiza-
tion is admissible under rule 406 to prove conformity to habit on a
particular occasion, under rule 404 character evidence is not ad-
missible to prove conformity to character, except in criminal cases
and upon credibility generally. 65 Rule 404 specifies the exceptions
in criminal cases. Evidence of the accused's character offered to prove
that he did or did not commit the acts he is charged with doing is
admissible only if the accused places his character in issue by testi-
mony of his good character. If he does so, the prosecution may intro-
duce rebutting testimony. This is uniform law. It is not general
moral character, but the pertinent trait of character, that may be
shown. This is a significant limitation not always observed in the
trial of criminal cases under existing law. Once character evidence is
admitted, it may be used for its inferential value in showing innocence
or guilt. Some courts say that an acquittal may be determined by
character of the accused alone,66 but other courts permit its use as
65. See p. 219 infra.
66. See United States v. Wooden, 420 F.2d 251 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Weedin v. United
States, 380 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1967). Compare State v. McDowell, 290 N.W. 65 (Iowa
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an inference to be considered in evaluating all of the evidence in
the trial.1 Actually, the distinction makes little difference because
the jurors must always consider all of the evidence, and in the face
of the evidence against the accused the good character must be strong
enough under the circumstances to create a reasonable doubt in the
minds of the jurors. Obviously, the prosecution can use bad character
only as an inference consistent with guilt and there must be inde-
pendent evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Character
evidence of the accused in many criminal cases becomes an important
factor in determining the question of doubt. Section (2) of the rule
permits admissions of evidence, offered by the prosecution, of the
victim's character, but only after the accused has offered evidence
that the victim's character is bad.
Rule 404 does not include for civil cases the use of character
evidence to test the probability that acts were committed. This was
a deliberate exclusion as indicated in the notes to the rule. While
the use of character evidence upon this issue is uncommon, it has
been used particularly in the fraud and deceit cases, and its use
when relevant is provided for in Uniform rule 47. This use of char-
acter testimony in certain civil cases has received favorable com-
ment68 but is rejected because of its limited value as proof and because
of its effect of sidetracking jurors from the evidence of what actually
happened. The same reasoning applies in criminal cases, but there
the accused must raise the issue and by tradition he is entitled to
the benefit that may accrue.
Section (b) of rule 404 eliminates the use of other crimes, wrongs
or acts to prove character of a person from which an inference might
be drawn that actions in issue conform with character. One who
does bad acts is not necessarily a habitual wrongdoer, and one whose
conduct is generally good may at times depart from what is right.
The danger of admitting evidence of specific bad conduct is that
the triers of fact might readily conclude that if the accused has done
the act before he must have done the act in issue, that he is a two-
timer. All courts agree that the commission of other crimes or bad
acts cannot be used to show the propensity of a person to do such
1940), with State v. Fador, 268 N.W. 625 (Iowa 1936); see also State v. Bell, 221 N.W.
521 (Iowa 1928). These cases indicate that, while character of the accused could be
considered in determining a reasonable doubt, it should not overshadow decisive
evidence to the contrary.
67. See Mannix v. United States, 140 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1944); Singer v. United
States, 278 F. 415 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 258 U.S. 620 (1922); Capello v. State, 90 So. 191
(Fla. 1921).
68. See Falknor, Extrinsic Policies Affecting Admissibility, 10 RuTGERs L. REv. 574,
581-83 (1956).
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acts as proof that he did the act in question. The federal rule, in
accord with authorities generally,69 admits these other acts when
relevant as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident. While there
may be danger of misuse, the value of such evidence is said to out-
weigh the danger when it is offered for these purposes.7 0
B. Reputation or Opinion or Both To Prove Character
Rule 405, entitled "methods of proving character," provides:
(a) Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which evidence of
character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof
may be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the
form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into
relevant specific instances of conduct.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. In cases in which character or
a trait of character of a person is an essential element of a charge,
claim, or defense, proof may also be made of specific instances of
his conduct.
This rule represents a material change in the law. In the federal
courts, in Florida and in most states, character may be proved by
reputation but not by opinion, and this has been the rule whether
character evidence is offered on the issue of probability or credibility.71
69. A leading case on this subject is Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 847 (1959), in which evidence of other criminal acts was held to be
relevant and admissible to discredit the testimony of the accused's explanation of his
acts made to show innocence. See also Green v. State, 190 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1966). In Hawkins v. State, 206 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1968), evidence was held admissible
showing that participation in other crimes made the offense part of a common scheme
or plan. Accord, MODEL CODE OF EVIIENCE rule 311 (1942) and UNIFORM RuLE OF
EvIENcE 55.
70. For a discussion of admissibility and the danger of its misuse, see Slough &
Knightly, Other Vices, Other Crimes, 41 IOWA L. REV. 325 (1956); Note, Evidence-Other
Crimes, 29 MICH. L. REV. 473 (1931); Note, Evidence of Other Crimes in Montana,
30 MONT. L. REV. 235 (1969); Note, Admissibility of Evidence of Prior Criminal Acts
in a Criminal Prosecution, 13 U. FLA. L. REV. 372 (1960).
71. In the early common law, personal opinion was regularly used to show a
witness's own belief about the trait of an accused's character, but in 1865 in the case
of Regina v. Rowton, 10 Cox Crim. Cas. 25 (Eng. 1865), the English court excluded
opinion based upon personal knowledge and limited the proof of character to reputation.
The distinction was not made when character evidence was used to test credibility. In
the early years of the United States, the distinction between opinion and reputation
was not made; later the use of reputation alone became the uniform rule. For a
discussion of these issues, see 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1981-83 (3d ed. 1940). See also
Ladd, Techniques and Theory of Character Testimony, 24 IOWA L. REV. 498 (1939);
Ladd, Credibility Tests-Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 166 (1940).
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In Iowa, opinion testimony may be used to prove character of the
accused as it relates to probability but not to attack the credibility
of a witness; that may be done only by reputation as to character. 71
Wigmore and other writers have long advocated the admissibility of
opinion evidence whenever character is an issue.7 3 The committee
drafting the new Federal Rules regarded the use of opinion to be so
much the preferable means of proving character that it provided in
the March 1967 draft for the use of opinion evidence and excluded
the use of reputation evidence. It was the exact reversal of the then-
existing federal law. As there are many situations in which evidence
of reputation serves a useful purpose, a change was made in the
March 1971 draft providing that a character witness can give testimony
expressing his own opinion, or he may testify as to the reputation of
a person. There is no reason why the same character witness cannot
do both if he has sufficient knowledge to give the required preliminary
foundation testimony. What a responsible person thinks about the
character of one with whom he is well acquainted should be more
meaningful than the conglomerate hearsay gossip of the community.
Also, in urban living most people may have no reputation because
of the lack of general comment, but it would be possible to find
individual persons who had sufficient associations with another to
have an opinion with respect to him.74
Subsection (b) authorizes the admission of specific instances of
conduct when character or a trait of character of a person is an
essential element of a charge, claim or defense. This represents exist-
ing law. It is illustrated in the case of Harvey v. State,75 in which
the accused was charged with rape and the question was whether
there was consent by the prosecutrix. The trial court excluded evi-
dence that, on another occasion, when several women and a man were
drinking whiskey and dancing, she started to disrobe and when dared to
do a strip tease she continued dancing while taking off her garments
till she had on only her "panties." The case was reversed, the court
holding that the ecdysiast performance before a lone man in these
circumstances might imply consent to a later act.
72. See State v. Ferguson, 270 N.W. 874 (Iowa 1937); State v. Teager, 269 N.W.
348 (Iowa 1936). For a discussion of the issue, see Ladd, Techniques and Theory of
Character Testimony, 24 IOWA L. REV. 498 (1939).
73. 5 J. WiGMoRE, EVmEN E §§ 1608-21 (3d ed. 1940); Ladd, Techniques and Theory
of Character Testimony, 24 IowA L. REV. 498 (1939).
74. See Hamilton v. State, 176 So. 89 (Fla. 1937), in which the general reputation
in the community was not needed and the reputation of the accused in the place in the
city where he was best known was admitted. See also Annot., 112 A.L.R. 1013 (1938).
75. 138 So. 2d 270 (Ala. Ct. App. 1962).
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C. Character Evidence and Credibility of a Witness
The admission of character evidence to test the credibility of a
witness requires a direct attack upon his credibility before evidence
of good character may be introduced. The attack could be proof of
a previous conviction of a crime or testimonial evidence that his
credibility is unreliable, but proof of prior inconsistent statements is
not enough .7 Federal rule 608 (a) sets out the methods of proof and
limits the use of character evidence to the proof of truthfulness and
to the rebuttal of an attack upon character:
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credi-
bility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the
form of reputation or opinion, but subject to these limitations:
(1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or un-
truthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible
only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been
attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.
The new features of the federal rule are that it admits opinion
evidence as well as reputation, as previously considered under rule
405, and it limits the proof on character for truthfulness. In this it
accords with the wording usually used-reputation for "truth and
veracity"-and now also for opinion upon the subject. Some states
allow proof of general moral character upon the issue of truthfulness 77
but this has been excluded by the federal rule. While the totality of
all human traits embodied in general moral character may be a good
indication of a person's credibility, it carries too many possibilities
for the witness to consider other vices than false swearing when
testifying in respect to it.78
76. On requiring the accused to put his good character in evidence as to the trait
involved before evidence of bad character may be shown, see 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§§ 55-58 (3d ed. 1940). On the requirement that the character of a witness be attacked
by the adverse party before evidence of good character for truthfulness may be shown,
see 4 id. §§ 1104-22. The majority of courts do not allow character evidence to sustain
veracity when the only attack upon the witness is self-contradiction or proof of prior
inconsistent statements. Id. §§ 1108-09. In Florida, in accord with most courts, it has
been held that proof of prior inconsistent statements by a witness is not enough of
an attack upon his veracity to authorize the admission of earlier statements consistent
with the testimony given in the trial. Wofford Beach Hotel, Inc. v. Glass, 170 So. 2d
62 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965). See Alford v. Barnett Nat'l Bank, 188 So. 322 (Fla.
1939), a leading case discussing other situations in which the witness's character has
been brought into question by the party-opponent so as to entitle the proponent of the
witness or the witness, if he be a party, to introduce his good character for truthfulness.
77. See IowA COnE § 622.18 (1971).
78. For discussion of the dangers of testing credibility by evidence of general moral
character, see Ladd, Credibility Tests-Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 166, 184-87
(1940).
1973] 219
Florida State University Law Review
Federal rule 608 (b) makes a marked change in the law by per-
mitting cross-examination in respect to specific instances of conduct,
which are probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness and not remote
in time, of the witness himself or of a witness who testifies as to his
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. The complexities in the
cross-examination of a character witness who testifies to the reputa-
tion of the character of a person, as shown in the famous case of
Michelson v. United States,79 in which the accused was convicted of
bribery, are now eliminated. In that case, which was decided when
only reputation testimony was admissible, the defense counsel raised
the issue of the character of the accused by asking him in his direct
testimony if he had been convicted of a misdemeanor having to do
with trading in counterfeit watch dials, which conviction he admitted.
The question was asked to prevent the prosecution from doing so on
cross-examination with more telling effect. On cross-examination the
accused answered "no" to the question whether he had theretofore
been arrested or summoned for any offense. Five witnesses were called
to prove that he enjoyed a good reputation. After four witnesses had
testified favorably that his reputation was good, they were asked on
cross-examination if they had heard of the conviction which the de-
fendant admitted in his direct examination. Two of them said they
had and two said they had not. They were then asked if they had
ever heard that the defendant on a specified date was arrested for
receiving stolen goods, but none had heard this. All of this testimony
was received over objection and the court, out of the presence of
the jury, asked cross-examining counsel whether it was a fact that
this arrest occurred, to which the counsel said it was and to support
his good faith exhibited a record of the arrest that was not challenged.
The error relied upon in the appeal was the admission into evidence
of the questions about the former arrest. Error was claimed on the
ground that specific instances of misconduct, other than convictions
of a crime, cannot be admitted to attack or support credibility. This
is a generally accepted rule and is included in federal rule 608 (b).
But the court distinguished the situation in which the misconduct
is used as evidence of character from the situation where the purpose
of its admission is to show the unreliability of the character witnesses
for not having heard of facts inconsistent with their testimony on
reputation. If they had heard of the misconduct or of events that
would impair the reputation of a person, the judgment of the char-
acter witnesses that the reputation was good would be questionable.
Justice Jackson wrote an able and exhaustive opinion about the
79. 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
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cross-examination of a character witness testifying upon reputation.
He drew the distinction between asking the witness if he "had heard"
of other misconduct and asking the witness if "he knew" of other
impairing acts. The latter would be inadmissible because it would
relate to personal opinion of character, whereas what he "had heard"
was relevant to prove reputation and admissible for that purpose.
The court's opinion was sound in logic but becomes less important
with the new federal rule, which admits opinion testimony upon
character. Furthermore, the rule, set out below, authorizes cross-
examination as to specific instances to test the value of character
testimony without reference to whether it is opinion or reputation
evidence.
Rule 608 (b) provides:
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the con-
duct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his
credibility, other than conviction of a crime as provided in Rule
609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however,
if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness and not remote in
time, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness himself
or on cross-examination of a witness who testifies to his character
for truthfulness or untruthfulness.
The giving of testimony, whether by the accused or by any other
witness, does not operate as a waiver of his privilege against self-
incrimination when examined with respect to matters which relate
only to credibility.
The last paragraph of the above rule is needed because in rule
611 (b) the former law applied in federal courts is changed so as to
permit cross-examination upon any relevant issue in the case, including
credibility, subject to the discretion of the judge to limit it with
respect to matters not testified to on direct examination, if such
limitation is in the interest of justice. The rule assumes that the
privilege against self-incrimination is waived by testifying upon sub-
stantive issues, but when the testimony relates only to credibility the
privilege may be claimed.
III. CONVICTIONS OF CRIME
Convictions of a crime are used in two ways when offered as
proof in a trial. The most common use is for impeachment of the
credibility of witnesses, and the law upon this subject varies from
state to state and has lacked uniformity in the federal circuits. The
other use arises when a judgment of conviction is offered in evidence in
another trial to prove the truth of facts that were essential to finding
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a verdict of guilty and rendering judgment of conviction. Upon this
matter there is a wide conflict of views. Rule 609 concerning im-
peachment will be considered first.
A. Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime
Rule 609 (a) and (b) provides:
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of
a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime is ad-
missible, but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he
was convicted, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement regardless
of the punishment.
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not
admissible if a period of more than 10 years has elapsed since the
date of his most recent conviction, the release of the witness from
confinement imposed for or the expiration of the period of his
parole, probation, or sentence granted or imposed with respect to
his most recent conviction, whichever is the later date.
An analysis of this rule shows both the breadth and the limitation
of its application. It covers all crimes that carry a penalty of more
than one year or of death. For these crimes it is not necessary that
they relate to dishonesty or false swearing. If the crime were murder
and the defense were that the killing occurred when the accused
found the victim in bed with his wife and was so enraged that he
killed, the conviction is admissible as an attack upon his credibility.
The implication of untruthfulness from the conviction could be re-
butted by proof of character evidence that the convicted person was
a truthful man, but the conviction is nevertheless admissible as an
attack upon his credibility. Model Code rule 106 and Uniform rule
21 provide that convictions of crimes not involving dishonesty or
false statement are not admissible to impair credibility even though
the crime is a serious one. The draftsmen of the federal rule felt,
concerning crimes for which punishment was more than one year,
that the court should not be required to psychoanalyze the truth-
testing elements of the crime, that they were serious enough to war-
rant admissibility on the credibility issue. The federal rule is in
accord with the rule of some states, which provides that previous
convictions of a felony are admissible for impeachment without limi-
tation upon the kind of felony. Some state codes, like the Model Code
and the Uniform Rules, draw no distinction between felonies and
misdemeanors but limit their use to those that are crimen falsi, or
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related to dishonesty or false swearing.80 The federal rule incorporates
this test when lesser crimes are offered for impeachment. Rule 609 (a)
(2) permits the use of convictions of lesser crimes for impeachment if
they involve dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punish-
ment.
There is no specification in the Federal Rules concerning how
the conviction may be proved or whether the identity of the kind of
a crime for which the witness was convicted may be mentioned. On
this subject, the recent Wisconsin case of Nicholas v. State,"' in an
opinion by Justice Hanley, gives a most illuminating and compre-
hensive discussion. By the law of that state the naming of the crime
cannot be made in the impeachment process, but if the witness denies
the conviction he may be asked for the purpose of identifying the
conviction, if he had not been convicted of a specified crime at a
designated time. The record of the conviction, showing what the
crime was, may also be introduced as proof. In Iowa, the nature of a
felony for which a witness had been convicted cannot be shown if the
witness is the accused and is being tried for the same offense as that
for which he was previously tried. The fear is that the jurors would
use the prior conviction as evidence of probability that he was guilty
of the same crime again in the case being tried.8 2 The usual method
of proof of prior convictions is inquiry on cross-examination or by
introduction of the record of conviction. When the record is used,
it is important to have additional testimony identifying the witness
as the person who had been convicted.
It is observed from the federal rule that the use of convictions
for impeachment is a matter of right for the party attacking credibility
and that the court cannot exclude this use because the trial judge
believes that its prejudicial effect in the case being tried would be
greater than its value for impeachment. In the District of Columbia
case of Luck v. United States, 3 it was held that the trial court had
discretion in determining its prejudicial effect, which would permit
the exclusion of evidence of prior convictions for impeachment in
deserving cases. The Luck case had wide judicial recognition and a
provision in accord with it was included in the March 1971 draft of
the proposed Rules, but it had not been included in the 1967 draft.
80. See generally Ladd, supra note 78, at 174-84.
81. 183 N.W.2d 11 (Wis. 1971).
82. See People v. Granillo, 36 P.2d 206 (Cal. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1934); State v.
Concord, 154 N.W. 763 (Iowa 1915).
83. 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965). For clarification in the application of the Luck
case, see Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967), an opinion by then
Judge Burger. For a recognition of the rule but a denial of its application under the
facts of the case, see Nicholas v. State, 183 N.W.2d 11 (Wis. 1971).
1973] 223
Florida State University Law Review
In the final draft as submitted to the United States Supreme Court
and to Congress, the provision that the court could exclude convic-
tions if the probative value of the evidence were substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice was withdrawn. The pro-
vision was removed for two reasons. First, after the Luck decision,
which was based upon the court's interpretation of a District of
Columbia statute,84 Congress enacted a statute applicable to the Dis-
trict eliminating the interpretation given in Luck by making impeach-
ment by prior convictions a matter of right.8 5 Thus the adoption of
the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence will not be jeopardized by
including a provision offensive to Congress. The other reason was a
consideration of the policy aspect of the proposal; if the matter were
left to the individual discretion of the trial judge the law would be
applied unevenly, some courts rejecting a prior conviction and others
admitting it upon similar factual situations. Actually, in all cases
the use of prior convictions to impeach the credibility of the accused
is prejudicial to him, 6 but the relevance of the convictions to the
truthfulness of his testimony is held to justify their admission. The
problem is open to reasonable debate but the Federal Rules in their
final form have taken a position commonly followed prior to the
Luck case.
Rule 609 (b) limits the use of previous convictions for impeach-
ment to those within a ten-year period from the date of the most
recent conviction or the expiration of parole, probation or sentence
with respect to the most recent conviction, whichever is the later date.
The limitation is fair in excluding remote convictions because of their
weakened value as a test of credibility; it also places a premium upon
good living for those who have shifted from the wrong to the right
path of life.
Paragraph (c) of the rule broadens provisions formerly admitted
84. D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-305 (1966).
85. District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, § 133,
84 Stat. 604 (1970).
86. In People v. Granillo, 36 P.2d 206, 211 (Cal. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1934), Justice
Willis said:
It is a matter of common experience and knowledge that once the average juror
learns that the defendant has previously been convicted of a crime of the
same class as that for which he is being tried, that juror will consciously or un-
consciously consider and allocate to a type or class the man on trial, as dis-
tinguished from the admeasuring of his credibility as the witness on the stand;
and this despite all instructions by the court ....
This might be controlled somewhat by not designating the nature of the crime in
introducing evidence of a conviction, but even the ordinary process of the human
mind is such that it would naturally gravitate toward the conclusion that the accused
was of bad character and ought to be put away, which a verdict of guilty would do.
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to sustain the credibility of witnesses whose convictions have been
shown by abandoning the use of convictions when certain events have
occurred. It provides:
(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or certificate of rehabilitation.
Evidence of a conviction is not admissible under this rule if (1) the
conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate
of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure, based on a sub-
stantial showing of rehabilitation and the witness has not been
convicted of a subsequent crime, or (2) the conviction has been the
subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent procedure
based on innocence.
B. Juvenile Adjudications of Delinquency
Rule 609 continues:
(d) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of juvenile adjudications
is generally not admissible under this rule. The judge may, how-
ever, allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other
than the accused if conviction of the offense would be admissible
to attack the credibility of an adult and the judge is satisfied that
admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the
issue of guilt or innocence.
Legislation establishing juvenile courts or giving other courts
juvenile jurisdiction prevents the use of the proceedings and adjudi-
cations as tests of credibility or for other purposes except when the
same delinquent later appears upon another matter before a juvenile
court making the adjudication.8 7 Although serious criminal acts may
have been committed by a juvenile, the adjudication in respect to
him is not designated a conviction of a crime; the juvenile is simply
determined to be a delinquent and placed in custody in a public
institution for rehabilitation rather than for punishment. The juvenile
judge was given almost unlimited discretion without restriction by
the rules of evidence and by the procedures of the law that help to
assure just factual determinations required for adults. The freedom
of the judge to simply talk things over with the juvenile and determine
what he regards best for him removes all semblance of a regular court
hearing although a decision could result in his custodial confinement
in an industrial school until he becomes an adult. Because of the
87. See 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 196 (2) (c), at 673 n.5 (3d ed. 1940), for a listing
of state statutes. Courts have generally not regarded juvenile adjudications as usable
for impeachment. Thomas v. United States, 121 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Cotton v.
United States, 355 F.2d 480 (10th Cir. 1966). See the reporter's notes to rule 609
citing the authorities mentioned and giving an informative discussion of the reasons
for the new federal rule.
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requirement of confidentiality and because of the inconclusiveness
of factual determinations, juvenile adjudications have been generally
excluded when offered as tests of credibility when the juvenile appears
as a witness. This distressed Wigmore, who felt strongly that they
should be admitted for impeachment purposes, especially in sex
offense cases.88
An extensive review of the juvenile court process and its laxity in
factual determinations is found in the monumental case of In re
Gault. 9 The Court recognized the salutary objectives of the juvenile
court legislation but held that it failed to give the juvenile the same
constitutional protections that are accorded to an adult, even though
juvenile adjudications often result in custodial confinement of a minor
far in excess of a penitentiary or other sentence of an adult convicted
for similar misconduct. The Court also observed the failure of correc-
tional institutions to achieve the rehabilitation contemplated and
looked upon them as but a different form of custodial confinement.
Therefore the Court held that in juvenile adjudications the minor is
entitled to adequate notification to him and his parents of the specific
complaint against him; that all of the requirements of the privilege
against self-incrimination, confrontation and cross-examination be ob-
served; that the right of counsel to represent the minor at the hearing
be assured; and that constitutional protections guaranteed to an adult
also belong to a juvenile. This decision changes the complexion of a
juvenile adjudication and makes it more reasonable to admit into
evidence for impeachment purposes an adverse adjudication on a
serious matter. This does not mean wide use of juvenile adjudications
as impeachment evidence because, as stated in the beginning of the
federal rule, they are not generally admissible. The position taken
would have satisfied Dean Wigmore as his forceful condemnation of
the exclusion of juvenile adjudications was largely directed to those
cases in which the evidence would be highly relevant to the issue
of truthfulness of the juvenile witness. 0
The last division of rule 609 found in paragraph (e) recognizes
the presumption of the correctness of a trial court's judgment rendered
upon a verdict for conviction until there is a reversal upon appeal.
During the pendency of appeal the conviction may be used for im-
peachment but the fact of appeal may be shown to vitiate the im-
peachment value of the conviction.
88. 3A J. WIcMORE, EvmWNcE § 980 (rev. ed. 1970).
89. 387 U.S. 1, 12-31 (1967). This is part of the ably written majority opinion of
Justice Fortas.
90. See 1 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 196 (3d ed. 1940); 3A J. WiGMORE, EvmENCE §§
924a, 980 (rev. ed. 1970).
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Rule 609 is a highlight in the new Rules as it provides for a
different application of the use of prior convictions for impeaching
purposes: tightening the application in places, broadening it in others
and resolving conflicts. The new rule excludes convictions founded
on a plea of nolo contendere, convictions followed by governmental
action showing rehabilitation and convictions pardoned for innocence.
C. Judgment of Conviction as Proof of Facts Essential
To Sustain the Conviction
Should a record of a judgment of conviction be admissible in a
civil case involving fact issues similar to those that were necessarily de-
termined in a criminal trial in order to sustain a conviction?91 Can the
conviction be used as proof of the truth of those facts when they are
being litigated in a civil trial? Does the conviction amount to more
than the opinion of another jury in the criminal case that the facts
had been established? Does the requirement in a criminal trial that
the facts be proved beyond a reasonable doubt justify the admission
of the conviction? Should there be a distinction between an action
instituted by the accused in a civil case and an action in which the
accused is not a party in determining the admissibility of a judgment
of conviction when the issuable facts in the criminal and civil case
are the same? Is the judgment of conviction hearsay when offered in
another trial to prove the facts embodied in it? Is it hearsay of a fact
or is it hearsay of an opinion of the jury in a criminal trial of the
truth of facts essential in that case? If it is hearsay, is an exception to
the exclusionary rule justified by the requirement in a criminal trial
that the facts be proved beyond a reasonable doubt? If it is an opinion,
and thus ordinarily excludable under the rule that witnesses must
testify to facts and not express their opinion upon them, should
variation in the opinion rule be made to authorize the admission of
the judgment of conviction? If the proof beyond reasonable doubt
requirement in criminal cases justifies the admission of the conviction
as proof of facts as an exception to the hearsay rule, is it not based
upon the assumption that the opinion objection does not apply? Is
an acquittal in a criminal case admissible to support the position of
the accused when he is a party in civil litigation? Does the acquittal
indicate what the verdict would have been had the jury applied the
standard of preponderance of the evidence? If acquittals are held
91. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 318 (2d ed. 1972), for thoughtful discussion of
admissibility of judgments in previous cases, especially criminal convictions offered in
subsequent civil cases. See also the reporter's notes to federal rule 803(22). An ex-
tensive annotation on the subject is found at 18 A.L.R.2d 1287 (1951).
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to be inadmissible in civil cases but convictions are admitted, can
the distinction be made for any reason other than the reliability
factor? What other reasons would there be?
Is the reason for admitting the prior conviction of the accused,
in a civil action brought by him, the public policy against letting a
person profit by his own wrong? Would this reason apply if the parties
in the civil litigation were other than the accused? Is the reason for
admissibility the public policy that a conviction in a criminal case
and a successful decision in a civil case requiring an opposite determi-
nation of the truth of facts would be such a discredit to the administra-
tion of justice and so shocking to the public conscience that measures
should be taken to prevent it? If this is the basic reason for admitting
the conviction, would it not apply to civil cases in which others than
the accused were parties to litigation that involved the same facts upon
which an accused person had his road paved to the penitentiary?
Should a judgment of conviction in a criminal case be regarded
as creating an estoppel or as being res judicata in a civil action on the
same facts or should it be admitted only as evidence of the facts in-
volved in the conviction for what it is worth? Would the identity of
parties as well as issues required for res judicata warrant the con-
clusive effect of the conviction? How serious should the crime be for
a conviction to be admitted in another case? Courts have varied in
their holdings in answer to the foregoing questions and for variegated
reasons. The Federal Rules represent the current thinking upon the
subject and are based upon the reliability value of the judgments of
conviction as evidence more than the policy considerations. The Rules
solve the problem by providing for their admissibility as an exception
to the hearsay rule only in cases where the conviction has been for a
serious crime.
Rule 803, entitled "hearsay exceptions: availability of declarant
immaterial," provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though
the declarant is available as a witness:
(22) Judgment of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judg-
ment, entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon
a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging a person guilty of a crime
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, to
prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment, but not including,
when offered by the government in a criminal prosecution for pur-
poses other than impeachment, judgments against persons other
than the accused. The pendency of an appeal may be shown but
does not affect admissibility.
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The federal rule indicates that the reasoning behind it is not
public policy but that the conviction by proof beyond reasonable
doubt creates a high degree of reliability. Thus it limits the admis-
sible conviction to those in which the authorized punishment for the
crime is death or imprisonment in excess of one year. In these cases
in which the crime charged is serious there is not only a strong motive
to defend, but also every opportunity to do so through cross-examina-
tion and other techniques. In less serious cases, such as the violation
of traffic laws, the same motive would not be present and a conviction
would not be as reliable to establish the truth of the evidential facts
as it would if the crime were a serious one. Also, juries, in determining
whether there is a reasonable doubt, may weigh the evidence less
carefully for minor crimes than for serious crimes.
In the Florida cases, the statement has been broadly made that a
judgment of conviction in a criminal case cannot be introduced in a
civil trial to prove the truth of facts essential to the conviction.9 2 The
cases in which the issue was involved, however, were civil cases con-
sidering the negligence of the defendant, and a conviction for reckless
driving was excluded from evidence. The same result would be reached
under the federal rule in the traffic violation cases, unless the criminal
charge was one in which the punishment could be for more than
one year, such as indictment for manslaughter for a homicide re-
sulting from reckless driving. In a recent case, Boshnack v. World
Wide Rent-A-Car, Inc., 3 involving the speed of a car, a plea of guilty
upon which a judgment of conviction was rendered was held admis-
sible as an admission. The Federal Rules would have excluded it,
although making no distinction between a judgment based on a plea
and one based upon a jury verdict, because the traffic violation was
not serious enough. The Florida decision should make attorneys aware
of the damaging effect of a plea of guilty in minor offenses and cause
them to try a criminal charge of traffic violations when the events
claimed to have occurred may also become the basis of a civil action.
The person who pleads guilty and pays a fine as a convenient means
of disposing of the matter may be in trouble if what he has plead
92. See Moseley v. Ewing, 79 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 1955); Stevens v. Duke, 42 So. 2d
361 (Fla. 1949). In each of the cases the statement of the rule as announced was that
it was subject to exceptions. The exceptions, although not designated, may be those
for which the federal rule provides admissibility. In accord with these Florida decisions
on traffic violations, see Brooks v. Daley, 218 A.2d 184 (Md. 1966); Bolen v. Buyze,
167 N.W.2d 808 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969); Gray v. Grayson, 414 P.2d 228 (N.M. 1966),
cited in C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 318, at 740 n.28 (2d ed. 1972).
93. 195 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 1967). In Gray v. Grayson, 414 P.2d 228 (N.M. 1966), the
reason for excluding a careless driving conviction was the lack of its probative force
as evidence of negligence.
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to becomes the subject of civil litigation. Although a conviction upon
a plea of guilty necessarily amounted to an admission of a traffic
violation, when put to the test of its probative value, is it strong
enough to be admitted? If admitted, the accused ought to be per-
mitted to testify giving the reason why he entered the plea and the
amount of the fine, if it was small, in order to mitigate its damaging
effect.
Should judgments of conviction of serious crimes be conclusive
upon the issues when the accused is one of the parties in subsequent
civil litigation? It has been held that if the accused has been convicted
of arson and later brings an action upon a fire insurance policy to
recover for the fire loss, the conviction is determinative of the civil
action.94 Likewise, in an action by a husband-beneficiary of a life in-
surance policy on his wife, the husband was precluded from recovery
because of a conviction for first degree murder of his wife.95 The cases
in which the convicted person seeks recovery in a civil action are
based primarily upon the theory that one should not be able to
benefit from his own wrong, but most cases limit the use of the prior
conviction to its evidential value in establishing a prima facie case.
The introduction of the conviction as evidence of the facts that sus-
tained it would appear to have a very strong influence upon the jury
in a civil case in the absence of a convincing explanation. If con-
victions may be used as evidence of the facts embodied in them
rather than as a conclusive determination of those facts, there should
be less resistance to wider adoption of rules permitting their admissi-
bility. Also, the rule would apply to cases in which the accused was
not a party but in which all or some of the essential facts in issue
were the same as those on which the conviction depended. The pro-
bative value of the conviction would be the same whether the accused
was or was not a party to the civil litigation. The situation is some-
what analogous to the broader admission of testimony given in a
different proceeding as provided in federal rule 804 (b) (1). It creates
an exception to the hearsay rule by admitting former testimony "at
the instance of or against a party with an opportunity to develop
the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination, with motive
and interest similar to those of a party against whom now offered."
94. Eagle, Star and British Dominions Ins. Co. v. Heller, 140 S.E. 314 (Va. 1927).
If there had not been an estoppel and if the court had regarded the conviction as
evidence only, the jury might have decided favorably to the accused as plaintiff in
the civil action in spite of his conviction of the same fact issue; that is what happened
in North River Ins. Co. v. Militello, 88 P.2d 567 (Colo. 1939). Usually, the conviction
would have a more persuasive effect.
95. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 163 N.W.2d 289 (Minn. 1968), appeal dismissed,
395 U.S. 161 (1969).
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This rule dispenses with the necessity as it existed in common law of
identity or privity of parties as a condition for admitting former
testimony and requires similarity of motive and interest as the test
of probative value. Federal rule 803(22) admits prior convictions for
their evidential value but without conclusive effect in a civil trial.
The rule does not extend the admissibility of a conviction as
proof of facts "when offered by the Government in a criminal prose-
cution for purposes other than impeachment" in criminal cases in
which the convicted person is not a party. In civil cases relevancy,
determined by the similarity of the facts, is the test of admissibility
of prior conviction irrespective of who the parties are. In a criminal
case in which the formerly convicted accused is being tried upon
another offense and in which some of the fact issues are the same as
those in the former conviction, the prior conviction is admissible as
evidence of those facts against him. If all of the fact issues were the
same as in the former trial, the former conviction would ordinarily
terminate the trial on a plea of double jeopardy. But assume the
same acts by the accused, if he did them, constituted separate crimes,
one against a state and the other against the federal government.
Under the new rule it appears that a judgment of conviction in the
state court is admissible in a subsequent federal trial as evidence of
the truth of the facts required to sustain the state conviction. Convic-
tion of state crimes will serve a useful purpose as evidence in federal
criminal cases involving transportation across state lines, such as the
transportation of stolen property or violations arising under the
Mann Act.96 For their use, the convicted person must be the accused
in a criminal trial in which the conviction is offered. If persons other
than the accused are the defendants in a criminal trial, his former
conviction is not admissible as evidence of facts against them. The
wording of the federal rule is specific and clear but does require
thoughtful analysis to see its different applications. This provision
removes what might be constitutional issues the Rules seek to avoid,
although all of the Rules are subject to the test of constitutionality
and may be changed by act of Congress or other rules adopted by
the Supreme Court.
A judgment of conviction upon a plea of nolo contendere is not
admissible under the Federal Rules as proof of the involved facts.
Such pleas are common in antitrust suits and provide a means of
disposing of many cases in which the plea authorizes the court to pro-
nounce judgment without an acknowledgment of guilt in what might
be a long and unnecessary trial. If the judgment of conviction on a
96. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-24 (1970).
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nolo plea could be used as evidence of the facts assumed in rendering
the judgment, it would discourage its use and contradict its purpose
in the many cases that are best disposed of in this way.97
The rule concludes with a provision that the pendency of appeal
does not prevent admissibility of a judgment of conviction, but may
be shown for the intangible effect it may have in evaluating the force
of the conviction. The admission of a conviction of a crime may be
claimed to have a prejudicial effect upon the claim of the person or
party against whom it is offered, whether it be used to test credibility
or offered as proof of facts. Evidence is not excluded because it is
prejudicial if it is relevant to the issues for which it is offered, unless
the prejudice is so great that it absorbs the rightful use for which it
is admitted. In weighing the probabilities, the need of the triers of
fact and of the court to have all available relevant information having
probative value in order to reach a just decision should be a para-
mount consideration.
CONCLUSION
It is believed that the Federal Rules that have been considered
in this article represent a significant development and improvement
in the law of evidence. Are they highlights of the Rules? Really not.
97. The plea of nolo contendere in recent years has been widely used in criminal
antitrust and tax violation cases and in all kinds of other criminal cases as well. When
the plea has been made, the court may impose any sentence that could have been
imposed had the accused pleaded guilty, with the possible exception of the death
penalty which, by statutes and possibly by state constitutions, is the province of the
jury. In a 1912 federal case, Tucker v. United States, 196 F. 260 (7th Cir. 1912), it
was stated that a fine only could be imposed on a nolo plea, not imprisonment. This
was dictum, however, as the sentence was a fine. Some states take this view, but in
Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451 (1926), a sentence of imprisonment for con-
spiracy was upheld, Justice Stone writing the opinion and giving an historical review
of the use of the plea. A leading recent case, Peel v. State, 150 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1963), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 986 (1965), held that the court could im-
pose a life sentence on the accused in a first degree murder case under a plea of nolo
contendere. Acting Chief Judge Allen, in an extensive opinion, considered Florida and
other state and federal cases in a thorough analysis of the problem. The plea is
sometimes spoken of as an implied admission or confession of guilt or other similar
expression, but the court does not make an adjudication of guilt. The nolo plea is
the equivalent of a plea of guilty for the purpose of sentencing only and has no
effect other than in the particular case. The plea avoids an admission of guilt and
indicates the accused's desire not to contend the charges against him while realizing
that the court will impose punishment when he does not do so. It is generally held
that a judgment on a nolo contendere plea cannot be used in a civil case against the
defendant. Tseung Chu v. Cornell, 247 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
892 (1958). But cf. State v. Evans, 94 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1957). The new federal rule is con-
sistent with former federal holdings in limiting the plea of nolo to the case in which
the sentence is imposed and preventing its admission to prove the facts of the charge
in civil or other cases. See Annot., 89 A.L.R. 2d 540 (1963); Annot., 152 A.L.R. 253 (1944).
NEW FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
They are just interesting or even exciting to lawyers and judges who,
as members of the bar, are intrigued by logic and reason as applied
to their critical task of solving the unending conflicts arising out of
human behavior. All of the new Federal Rules are highlights in a
sense, and they become more so when used in advice to clients upon
matters in which there are disputed questions of fact or in the court-
room where the decision upon them may ultimately be made. A
study of all the new Federal Rules and the exceptionally informative
and well-written notes accompanying them will be a worthwhile
undertaking by members of the legal profession. A careful examination
of the Rules may cause lawyers and bar associations to initiate a re-
view of state laws of evidence to accomplish needed improvement in
the administration of justice. Any state undertaking this task will be
aided by the new Federal Rules, which represent years of study and
long hours of devoted work by able trial lawyers, judges and teachers
of evidence who had the benefit of nation-wide suggestions and
criticism in their formulation. If states were to adopt the Federal
Rules, with variations only as they may deal with the few matters
of special state concern, members of the bar would benefit from rules
that would uniformly apply in state and federal courts.
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